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We present a simple game model where agents with dierent memory lengths compete for nite
resources. We show by simulation and analytically that an instability exists at a critical memory
length, and as a result, dierent memory lengths can compete and co-exist in a dynamical equilib-
rium. Our analytical formulation makes a connection to statistical urn models, and we show that
temperature is mirrored by the agent's memory. Our simple model of memory may be incorporated
into other game models with implications that we briey discuss.
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I. INTRODUCTION
All successful forms of life must eventually engage in
competition for resources. The equilibrium analysis of
these competitions began with von Neumann [1] and
Nash [2]. The theory of games has since found applica-
tions in genetics, ecology, economics and sociology [3{6].
Computational implementation of games leads to agent-
based models, which may be of particular importance in
understanding the behaviour of nancial systems [6, 7].
For example, the particularly successful minority game
model [8{11], captures the competition between intelli-
gent agents with a restricted form of memory. Recent
work suggests such games may be generalised leading to
clearly separated regimes of behaviour [12]. In general,
understanding the complex collective behaviour arising
from the non-linear interactions between individuals is a
major challenge for statistical physics [13, 14].
In this paper we present a simple discrete time game
model: individual agents reside in one of two urns, each
oering a stochastic yield to be shared by the residents.
Each agent has a memory of these payouts for the previ-
ous  rounds, and may switch urns, using this memory to
aid its decision. Such stochastic yield sharing is known as
\exploitative competition" in ecological settings, where
the urns may represent dierent prey species [15] or for-
aging patches [16, 17]. Stock market investors may also
be viewed as foragers [18], searching for under-exploited
stocks, although price dynamics adds an extra layer of
complexity to the game in this case. Some form of intel-
ligence is essential in order to compete [19]. As with the
minority game [8], agents' memory in our model is a tool
for decision making, but our agents' memory is used to
make direct estimates of the highest paying choice, rather
than to second guess opponents' next moves. Whereas
minority game agents possess both a detailed short term
bit-string memory, and a secondary memory in the form
of their strategy scores, our agents' only tool is a nite
version of the latter memory type; they are more prim-
itive. The behaviour we uncover is related to the nite
length of this memory: it is possible for payos to be
remembered for too long. In the minority game the op-
timal length bit-string memory maximizes coordination
between agents, but in our game the protability of dif-
ferent memory lengths is due to a competition between
obtaining accurate statistics and maintaining stability.
In common with the thermal minority game [10], dy-
namical urn models [21], and some evolutionary games
[22], our agents have a \selection temperature", which
captures the level of noise in the switches they make in
search of yields. We nd that the additional noise in-
herent in their nite memory samples, which is greater
for shorter memories, leads the system to behave as if
its agents have a higher temperature. Therefore, increas-
ing memory \cools" the system. However, at a critical
memory, a Hopf bifurcation [23] emerges producing sta-
ble cycles in the numbers of agents in each urn. Perhaps
not surprisingly, a long memory is advantageous when the
system possesses a stable xed point, but the presence of
these cycles allows short memory agents to compete, and
a mixed memory system will evolve toward the bifurca-
tion point. Our theoretical formulation follows that of
statistical urn models such as Ehrenfest's dog ea model
[24], which played an important role in the early develop-
ment of statistical mechanics, and more recently allowed
analytical investigation of eects such as slow relaxation
and condensation in nonequilibrium statistical mechanics
[21].
Whilst we have restricted our analysis to a yield shar-
ing game, our simple model of memory may be applied in
general to social systems where agents make decisions to
switch between behaviours based their memory of past
payos or interactions. Simple systems in which mem-
ory could naturally be incorporated include the Hawk
Dove [3] and Rock Scissors Paper [25] games, or the voter
model [26]. The fact that systems of interacting units dis-
play a remarkable range of collective behavior controlled
by temperature suggests that these behaviours, includ-
ing condensation and the emergence of order [26], which
have social interpretation, may also have a connection
with memory [27], but that long memory can also intro-
duce instability.
2II. MODEL DEFINITION
Consider the case of two urns and a total of n agents.
We let the urn yields, U1(t); U2(t), at round t be ran-
dom variables uniformly distributed on [0; !n] and [0; n]
respectively, where ! > 1 so that urn 1 yields more on
average than urn 2. This choice of yield distribution is
motivated by simplicity - only one extra model parame-
ter, !, is required to describe it. The behaviour we un-
cover is not tied to the particular choice of yield distribu-
tion; it requires only that the yields have nite variance,
allowing the central limit theorem [28] to be applied to
sums of payos. We allow agents access to the arithmetic
mean of the last  payos, but we note that other forms
of sampling could be used. Letting t be the fraction of
agents in urn 1, then the dierence in the average payos
between urn 1 and urn 2 is
t :=
1

 1X
s=0

U2(t  s)
n(1  t s)  
U1(t  s)
nt s

: (1)
We refer to  as the \memory length" of the agents.
Agent dynamics is encoded in transition probabilities be-
tween urns, which are deterministic functions of t. At
each round, each agent will switch urns using the proba-
bilities
W1!2() =

2
[1 + tanh()] (2)
W2!1() =

2
[1  tanh()] : (3)
These so called \Fermi Functions" are used in evolution-
ary game models [22, 29, 30] where changes in strategy
are made based upon perceived increases in payo, but
with some degree of noise or irrationality in the switch-
ing process. The level of this stochasticity in decision
making, which has been experimentally measured in hu-
mans [31] is captured by the parameter , the \inverse
temperature". For nite , agents may decide to switch
strategies even though their estimate of the payo dif-
ference is unfavourable. In the limit  ! 1 agents will
only move if their estimate of the payo dierence in-
dicates that the move is favourable. The parameter 
controls the rate at which strategy switching takes place
compared to the rate at which yield information arrives,
or equivalently the inertia in agent's decision making. It
may also be seen as the frequency with which opportuni-
ties to switch strategy arise. In the limit ! 0, at most
one agent will move at each round. We note that the
eects we uncover in the remainder of this paper do not
require that the transition probabilities take the partic-
ular forms (2) and (3). In the Appendix we show that
the same qualitative behaviour is observed for transition
probabilities that increase in proportion with perceived
payo dierence (), provided the dierence is positive
and jj <  1.
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FIG. 1. Evolution of t when n = 10
6, ! = 2,  = 5,  =
10 6 and 0 = 0:5. Memory values are  2 f5; 10; 50; 500g
(squares, circles, dots, triangles). Dashed lines are analytical
equilibrium values (see equation (12)). Critical memory (see
section IV) is c  1:8 105.
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FIG. 2. Evolution of t when n = 10
6, ! = 2,  = 5,  = 10 3
and 0 = 0:5. Memory values are  2 f5; 50; 500g (squares,
circles, dots, triangles). Dashed line is solution to equation
(15) when  = 500 and !; ;  are as above. Critical memory
(see section IV) is c  390.
III. SIMULATION
A. Instability
We simulate the model for a series of values of  when
n = 106. Two dierent values of  are used; in Figure 1
we have  1 = 106   and in Figure 2 we have  = 10 3.
For  = 10 6, the expected number of moves at each step
is < 1, and  appears very stable. For larger ,  expe-
riences much larger uctuations about the steady state
value, driven by the yield process. For shorter memory
values these uctuations are random, but as  approaches
 1, periodic oscillations appear and dominate. The ap-
pearance of these stable oscillations at critical memory,
c, calculated analytically in section IV, is known as a
3Hopf bifurcation [23]. From Figures 1 and 2 we see that
the number of rounds taken for the system to evolve to
steady state, in the probabilistic sense, starting from an
equal distribution between the two urns, is   1. By
allowing agents access only to the mean of their memory,
we implicitly assume that changes in the expected pay-
o over the course of their memory, brought about by
oscillations, are too subtle for them to infer from noise.
B. Coexistence
We now investigate how agents with two dierent
memories compete against one another by interpreting
the payo as reproduction rate. We dene  and  as
rates of death, and reproduction per unit payo, respec-
tively. Reproduction is assumed to occur before death
in each round, but in practice the probability of any one
agent reproducing and dying in the same round is ex-
tremely small for the ;  values we choose. Letting pi (t)
be the number of agents with memory  in urn i at time
t we set the probability of birth for each agent in urn i
to be
P(birth) =
Ui(t)P
 p

i (t)
: (4)
The denominator in this term is the total population in
urn i, reecting the fact that the yield Ui(t) is shared
between all agents in the urn. When a given agent repro-
duces, he produces a copy of himself in his current urn,
having the same memory length,  . The death probabil-
ity for each agent is set equal to . If populations are xed
in size and the system is not in an oscillatory state, then
we expect that in equilibrium the longer memory agents
will dominate the high yielding urn. Their long mem-
ory allows them to perceive smaller statistical advantages
that are obscured by noise for the short memory agents.
Using the thermodynamic analogy, the higher temper-
ature (shorter memory) agents are more likely to make
moves which leave them in an urn with a lower expected
payo, corresponding to a higher \energy" state. Above
zero temperature, and in the absence of oscillations, the
high yield urn will be under-exploited, placing high mem-
ory agents at an advantage. This eect can be observed
in Figure 6 where we have simulated a mixed population
of two memories  2 f10; 1000g beginning with a ratio of
10:1 short memory to long memory agents. We see that
initially the advantage aorded the long memory agents
causes their population to grow, whereas the short mem-
ory agents reduce in number. Were this advantage to
be sustained indenitely then we would expect the short
memory agents to eventually disappear, but in fact the
populations stabilize. This eect appears because the
long memory agents cause oscillations to develop once
they are in suciently high concentration. In the pres-
ence of oscillations the short memory agents have an ad-
vantage because they can quickly observe opportunities
oered by the oscillating payos. We therefore expect
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FIG. 3. Scaled populations p (t) := p1(t) + p

2(t) for  = 10
(circles) and  = 1000 (triangles) when total initial popu-
lation is n = 106,  = 10 3,  = 5 with  = 10 4 and
 = 210 4. Also shown (thin black line) is evolution of vari-
ance of t, over a moving time window of 10
5 steps, during
population dynamics simulation. Straight dashed line shows
variance of homogeneous population with the same ; ; ! val-
ues at critical memory c  390, where c is calculated an-
alytically using the theory of Hopf bifurcation (section IV).
Note: rapid initial equilibration of population values (bring-
ing birth and death into balance) is not visible on time scale
of plot.
the system to evolve to the point where oscillations are
just beginning to form. We may observe this evolution
by making use of the variance of t as an order parameter
which captures proximity to the Hopf bifurcation point.
In Figure 6 we see that at a critical ratio of short to long
memory agents, the variance climbs rapidly, stabilizing
just below the value seen in a system where all agents
have memory c but all other parameters are equal. In
this way the Hopf bifurcation may be viewed as a self
organized state.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Equilibrium
We consider the behaviour of the model as  ! 0,
allowing us to view it as an urn model in the Ehrenfest
class [21] where agents independently make transitions
using state (t) dependent probabilities. Provided  
 1, the fraction t may be approximated by a constant
 during the window over which payo averaging takes
place. In this case, by the central limit theorem, the
marginal distributions of t for each t are approximately
normal N( ; 2=) where, from (1)
(; !) :=
1
2

1
1    
!


(5)
2(; !)

:=
1
12

!2
2
+
1
(1  )2

: (6)
4We now introduce a intermediate time scale T satisfying
  T   1 and dene the time average hi, over a
window of length T
hWi!j()i(t) := 1
T
tX
s=t T+1
Wi!j(s): (7)
This average is a random variable which, for constant ,
has expected value E[Wi!j()] where the expectation is
taken over the marginal distribution of . The condition
  T   1 ensures that  is approximately constant
over the window and that the variance of hWi!j()i is
proportional to T 1 (because t1 and t2 are depen-
dent only when jt2   t1j <   T ). As  ! 0, then
assuming T is suciently large, the probability that an
agent will make a transition i ! j during interval T
approaches T hWi!j()i  TE[Wi!j()], equivalent to
a memoryless (Ehrenfest class) model where transition
probabilities (2,3) are replaced with their expectations
E[Wi!j()]. Averaging over the normally distributed
dierence  we nd that
hW1!2()i  E[W1!2()]  
2

1 + tanh( )

(8)
where
 =
s
22
2 + 22
: (9)
To obtain this result, we have made the approximation
tanh()  erf(p=2), allowing us to make use of
the exact relationship E[erf(
p
=2)] = erf(
p
 =2).
The constant  acts as an eective inverse tempera-
ture and we see that increasing  \cools" the system
closer to the inverse temperature , and in the limit
 ! 1,  / p . To complete our analogy to a ther-
mal urn model we now write the probability of nding
the agents in a particular arrangement, or microstate, i,
such that a fraction  are in urn 1, as pi() / e E
where E is an \energy" function. Considering two mi-
crostates separated by a single transition, and dening
 = 1=n, then detailed balance requires that in equilib-
rium 2  = @(E). This condition allows E() to
be computed, in principle, by integration. A closed form
approximation E()   n ln [!(1  )] is obtained by
noting that  depends weakly on  compared to E so
that @(E)  @E. Summing over all microstates cor-
responding to macrostate  we have a Boltzmann prob-
ability distribution for 
P() =
n!
(n)!(n(1  ))!
e ()E()
Z ; (10)
where Z is the partition function. Taking the thermody-
namic limit n!1, and making use of Stirling's approx-
imation, we nd that the most likely fraction, , satises:
1
2n
@
@
lnP() =    2+ 1 = 0: (11)
As the memory increases and the system cools we ex-
pect the agents to arrange themselves so that yields are
shared more fairly. We therefore linearize (11) about the
perfectly fair state,  = !=(1 + !), where agents in both
urns receive the same expected payo, nding that
  f() +
(1+!)2
2
2f() + (1+!)
3
2!
; (12)
where f() =
p
1 + 2(1 + !)2=(12). The accuracy
of this approximation is veried in Figure 1. For larger
values of  (Figure 2) agents move more quickly so the
averaging eect (8) damps uctuations in transition rates
less strongly, creating larger uctuations in t. For nite
 the system cannot reach perfect fairness for any mem-
ory length, but in the limit  !1 where the transition
probabilities (2,3) become step functions, we have that:
  !
! + 1

1 
p
(!   1)p
3(! + 1)2
+O( 1)

: (13)
From this we see that the distance away from the fair
state decreases as  1=2 as the memory of the agents
becomes large.
We have shown that provided the timescales of switch-
ing and agent memory are suciently separated, then
our model behaves as a memoryless dynamical urn model
[21, 24] with time averaged transition rates. This aver-
aging is equivalent to a rescaling of temperature, and we
have given an approximate analytic expression for this
new temperature, ; in terms of the underlying \selec-
tion temperature" of agents, , and their memory length,
 . The study of the dynamics of particles in urns began
with Ehrenfest's dog-ea model [24], where agents make
random transitions between two urns at a xed rate with-
out reference to energy or temperature. Thermal models
[21] include an energy, E, and have transition probabil-
ities which respect detailed balance with respect to the
Boltzmann distribution. These probabilities are decreas-
ing functions of E where E is the energy change
associated with the transition, and  is inverse thermody-
namic temperature, so that reducing temperature makes
energy increasing transitions less likely. In our case, 
plays the role of an energy change and  is the inverse
temperature. Increasing memory reduces , making pay-
o reducing transitions less likely. However, if memory
is increased to the extent that it becomes comparable
to the timescale of switching between urns (  1) then
the model begins to behave quite dierently to classical
thermal urn models [21, 24]. It becomes important that
the average payo agents use to make decisions is calcu-
lated from the history of the system. This is because the
populations in the urns are able to change signicantly
during the course of a single agent's memory, and so us-
ing delayed information for decision making can falsely
identify the optimal urn. To understand mathematically
why increasing  too far, when  is nite, destabilizes the
system, we must make use of the theory of delay dier-
ential equations [23].
5B. Instability
As  increases, uctuations in t due to the yield pro-
cess are reduced but for nite  we can no longer treat t
as a constant over the averaging window. It is instruc-
tive, therefore, to study the eect of variations in t,
neglecting the variations in yield. Promoting t to a con-
tinuous variable and replacing the urn yields with their
mean values we have
t  1
2
Z t
t 

1
1  s  
!
s

ds: (14)
We then approximate the evolution of t using the fol-
lowing delay dierential equation:
_t = (1  t)W2!1(t)  tW1!2(t): (15)
A numerical solution to this equation is shown in Figure
2, along with simulation results using the same parameter
values. The oscillations in the simulation are accurately
captured by (15) but the stochastic yield disrupts their
perfect periodicity. To discover the parameter values at
which stable oscillations develop we linearize equation
(15) by writing t =  +  t where  t are small uctu-
ations and  is the constant xed point, not necessarily
stable, of equation (15). In terms of these new variables
t  (; !) + 6
2(;
p
!)

Z t
t 
 sds (16)
where the functions  and 2 are dened in (5) and
(6). After expanding the tanh functions in the transition
rates to rst order about (; !), we obtain the following
linear delay equation
_ t =  

 t +
A

Z t
t 
 sds

(17)
where A = 3sech2[ (; !)]2(;
p
!). To determine
the stability of this equation we introduce an exponential
trial solution  t = e
t where  = x + iy. Substitution
into equation (17) yields a characteristic equation with
real and imaginary parts given by
x2   y2 + x+ A

 
1  e x cos y = 0 (18)
2xy + y +
A

e x sin y = 0: (19)
For suciently small memory,  , the real part, x, of
the solutions to (18) and (19) is negative so the xed
point  is stable. As we increase  ,  crosses through
the imaginary axis, destabilizing the xed point and cre-
ating oscillations of exponentially increasing magnitude
in the linearized version (17) of the full delay equation
(15). Although the xed point of the full equation (15)
shares this transition to instability, we nd that the re-
sulting oscillations are bounded. The appearance of these
stable oscillations as  passes through a critical value,
which we denote c, constitutes the Hopf Bifurcation [23].
To compute c we set x = 0 in equation (19) so that
sinc(y) = A 1. Expanding the sinc function to sec-
ond order about its root at = and solving the resulting
quadratic we nd that
y  
2

3 
p
1  4A 1

:=


(20)
which denes a new constant . Substitution of this so-
lution into (18), yields the following expression for the
critical memory length
c =
2
A(1  cos) : (21)
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FIG. 4. Estimated variance of t in steady state, as a function
of memory length  , from simulations with n = 106, ! = 2,
 = 5 and  = 10 3 (squares), 10 4 (dots), 10 5 (circles).
Variance estimates computed using time average over 106 time
steps for  2 f10 3; 10 4g and 107 time steps for  = 10 5.
Vertical black line marks theoretical Hopf bifurcation point
c = 0:39, computed from equation (21).
In order to test this analysis, in Figure 4 we have
plotted estimates of the variance of t in equilibrium
as a function of memory length for three values of
 2 f10 3; 10 4; 10 5g. The transition from stable xed
point to limit cycles should, according to (21), occur
when the product  reaches a critical value, beyond
which we expect the oscillations to increase the vari-
ance of t. This behaviour is clearly observed in the
Figure. For the largest  value, the variance is signi-
cantly greater than zero for  < c because the shorter
memory length has a reduced damping eect on stochas-
tic uctuations in the yield process.
V. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a simple thermal urn model of
competition between agents with memory. Increasing
6memory allows agents to more accurately determine the
most productive strategy, and reduces the temperature
of the model. However, if a suciently high concentra-
tion of long memory agents is present a limit cycle ap-
pears which reduces their competitiveness, leading to a
self organized Hopf bifurcation driven by population dy-
namics. The simplicity of our memory model, its connec-
tion to classical urn models, together with the fact that
limit cycles arise naturally suggest it might be fruitfully
generalized, and employed to study a dierent games.
For example our approach may be applied to the Rock
Scissors Paper game [3], where agents, interacting pair-
wise, recall their last  interactions [34]. Other natural
extensions include the introduction of multiple urns to
represent dierent sources of yield or game strategies, or
heterogeneity in switching rates and a more general dis-
tribution of memory lengths. By introducing multiple
urns we might expect to observe more complex patterns
of oscillation [33] and regimes of behaviour [12]. Exper-
imental research into the nature of human and animal
memory [35{38] places emphasis on the \forgetting func-
tion" which describes how memories decay with time.
Such a function, or greater powers of statistical infer-
ence, could be naturally incorporated into our analysis,
and their eects on stability explored.
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APPENDIX: ALTERNATIVE TRANSITION
PROBABILITIES
In this appendix we address the following question: Is
the \Fermi Function" (smoothed step) transition prob-
ability essential to the eects we uncover? To motivate
this question, we note that the step form
W1!2() =

2
[1 + tanh()] (22)
produces transition rates which remain approximately
constant for values of the payo dierence   1. As
 becomes large, agents become progressively less sensi-
tive to the magnitude of the payo dierence, and in the
limit  !1 they react only to its sign.
As an alternative we consider the following form of
transition probability
~W1!2() =
(
min(; 1) if   0
0 if  < 0
(23)
with ~W2!1 = ~W1!2( ). Here we have no concept of
irrationality in agent behaviour and stochasticity in de-
cision making is driven purely by noise inherent in the
nite memory of agents. This corresponds to taking the
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FIG. 5. Evolution of t (fraction of agents in urn 1) using al-
ternative transition probabilities when n = 106;  = 10 3; ! =
2 and 0 = 0:5. Memory values are  2 f5; 100; 1750g (open
circles, dots, squares).
limit  ! 1 in the original rates. In contrast to the
original form (22), here the transition probability is pro-
portional to payo dierence provided that  <  1. For
the values of  we consider, this condition is always met
so, in contrast to the original rates, agents remain sensi-
tive to the magnitude of . With these new transition
rates, the connection to thermal urn models is lost be-
cause they do not satisfy detailed balance with respect
to a Boltzmann distribution for which  plays the role
of an energy change.
We rst explore the evolution of a system where all
agents have identical memory. In Figure 5 we consider
the case  = 10 3 where we see that provided agents'
memory is suciently short, the system remains stable.
As with the original rates, increasing memory brings the
system closer to the fair state  = !=(1 + !), but for
long enough memory, high amplitude regular oscillations
appear. Qualitatively, therefore, the system behaves in
the same way for both choices of rate. However, the crit-
ical memory length at which oscillations appear diers
between the two choices.
We now consider the case of mixed memory with pop-
ulation dynamics. In Figure 6 we have simulated a popu-
lation of two memory lengths  2 f100; 4000g in the case
 = 10 3. From Figure 5 we see that these memory val-
ues lie below and above the critical length respectively.
We see that the behaviour of the system matches its be-
haviour in the case of smoothed step rates (22): initially
the population of short memory agents declines. Whilst
the system possesses a stable xed point (no oscillations)
agents with a longer memory make more accurate esti-
mates of the true payo dierence between the urns and
are less likely to make detrimental moves. Once oscil-
lations appear, short memory agents have an advantage
because they respond more quickly to opportunities cre-
ated by oscillating payos. The onset of oscillations takes
place once long memory agents are in sucient concen-
tration, and is marked by a dramatic jump in the window
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FIG. 6. Scaled populations p (t) = p1(t) + p

2(t) for  = 100
(circles) and  = 4000 (triangles) when initial population is
n = 106 with memory types in ratio short:long = 10:1. Pa-
rameter values are  = 10 3,  = 10 4 and  = 210 4. Also
shown (thin black line) is evolution of variance of t, over a
moving time window of 105 steps, during population dynam-
ics simulation. Note: rapid initial equilibration of population
values (bringing birth and death into balance) is not visible
on time scale of plot.
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FIG. 7. Scaled populations p (t) = p1(t)+p

2(t) in the original
model with step rates when inverse temperature  ! 1.
Memory lengths are  = 10 (circles) and  = 1000 (triangles)
and initial population is n = 106 with memory types in ratio
short:long = 10:1. Parameter values are  = 10 3,  = 10 4
and  = 2  10 4. Also shown (thin black line) is evolution
of variance of t, over a moving time window of 10
5 steps,
during population dynamics simulation. Note: rapid initial
equilibration of population values (bringing birth and death
into balance) is not visible on time scale of plot.
averaged variance t. This jump coincides with a stabi-
lization of the population dynamics, indicating that the
advantage of long memory players has disappeared. Fig-
ure 6 demonstrates that the phenomenon of a dynamical
equilibrium between competing memory lengths appears
both with \smoothed step" probabilities (W ) and \pro-
portional" probabilities ( ~W ).
To complete our analysis we perform a population dy-
namics simulation using the original transition probabil-
ities (W ) in the limit  ! 1, obtaining a pure step
functional form
W1!2() =
(
 if   0
0 if  < 0;
(24)
so that individual agents react only to the sign of the per-
ceived payo dierence. In this way we are able to com-
pare the two types of transition probability when agents
have no intrinsic irrationality of behaviour. The simula-
tion results are shown in Figure 7. We use the same 
value in both simulations, but agents make fewer moves
with proportional rates because the payo dierence is
typically small:   1 ) ~W1!2()  . This de-
lays the appearance of payo dierences between mem-
ory lengths which drive the population changes, so these
changes take place on a longer time scale for proportional
transition probabilities. This eect is evident in Figures
6 and 7.
In both Figure 6 and Figure 7 we see that the pop-
ulation of short memory agents initially declines, but
eventually stabilizes. This stabilization occurs coinci-
dentally with a jump in the variance of t indicating
that that Hopf Bifurcation is responsible for the dynam-
ical equilibrium between memory lengths. It is inter-
esting to note that the jump in variance is more dra-
matic in the case of proportional probabilities (Figure
6). We suggest that this occurs because the proportional
form of transition probability damps uctuations more
eectively than the step form, so that when oscillations
do appear in t they have a more signicant eect on
the behaviour of the system, and therefore on the rel-
ative competitiveness of agents with dierent memory
lengths. Variance builds more gradually with step prob-
abilities because uctuations are damped less eectively,
and prior to the xed point losing stability, we see decay-
ing oscillations (under damping) which increase variance
when coupled with stochastic uctuations. The relative
equilibrium frequency of short to long memory agents
depends, in a non-trivial way, on the functional form of
switching probabilities, memory length and population
dynamics, and can vary quite considerably (Figures 6
and 7). A theoretical calculation of these equilibrium
population sizes remains an open challenge.
We conclude by noting that the proportional transi-
tion probability we have considered in this supplementary
material is a representative of a wider class of functional
forms which are zero when   0 and increase continu-
ously with  for  > 0. When  is small, the behaviour
of such systems will depend on the rst derivative of the
transition probability at  = 0+, which in the case we
have considered is equal to . We therefore expect to see
similar behaviour for all such forms when uctuations
about the xed point are small.
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